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Two years have elapsed since the last survey was printed, reflecting
judicial and legislative events of importance, as far as taxation and its effects
were concerned. That article' dealt with the years 1953 to 1955; a like
article of the same title had been written previously for the years 1951 to
1953.; The author's intention in this article is to continue -in an analytical
and sometimes critical manner - this biennial survey.3
Listed below is the organization of this article:
I Property Taxes:
(a) Real Property
(b) Tangible Personal Property
(c) Intangible Personal Property
(d) Homestead Exemption
II Sales and Use Taxes
III Occupational Licenses, Taxes
IV Unemployment Compensation Tax
V. Documentary Stamp Tax
VI Estate Tax
VII General and Miscellaneous Tax Matters
I. PROPERTY TAxES
(a) Real Property.-Certain cases dealt with the problems of exemption:
that is, exemption in general and homestead tax exemption. The latter is
treated in sub-section (d).
In 1956 the supreme court said, in dealing with section 192.06(3)
Florida Statutes (1955), that a charitable corporation may be exempt from
• Member of Florida Bar and former member of Austrian Bar; Florida C.P.A.
1. Schiller, Florida Taxation, 10 MAsil L.Q. 247 (1956).
2. Shugerman, Florida Taxation, 8 MIANI L.Q. 151 (1954).
3. Considered in this survey are decisions of the Supreme Court of Florida reported
in 80 So.2d through 96 So.2d, including advance sheets through September, 1957. The
article also embraces tax legislation enacted during the 1957 session of the Florida Leg-
islature.
The author gives notice that certain aspects of taxation are excluded. Questions
of constitutionality have not been considered, these being left to the survey article dealing
with Florida constitutional law. Problems of tax titles, tax deeds, tax sales certificates,
tax liens and related matters are dealt with in the survey article on Florida property.
Finally, it ought to be noted that not all decisions of the Florida Supreme Court
or all of the acts of legislation have been found to be significant enough for comment.
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property taxes even though it is not "one hundred per cent - charitable."
That not more than seventy-five per cent of the floor space of the property
owned by the corporation was rented was in issue. The case was remanded
for further proceedings to determine the percentage of floor space rented:
also the court stated that the fact that the testimony of the plaintiff-corpora-
tion's officer was vague was not sufficient to grant a summary judgment for
the defendant-taxing authority.4
In the same connection a "Turnpike" case was decided which reiterated
the tax exempt status of the property of the State Turnpike Authority.6
A deficiency in the description of property did not help the taxpayer
invalidate an assessment in Monroe County.6 Section 192.21 Florida Statutes
(1957) charges property owners with notice that properties are liable for
taxes, including municipal taxes. Although it is true that the pertinent
parts of Section 192.21 are only procedural directory provisions, it is rather
strange to have the court state that "illegalities in assessments do not effect
the duty to pay a lawful tax." On the other hand where one sees equitable
relief from taxes, one must offer to do equity. Where as in this instance, the
taxpayer-property owner did not sue within the prescribed time, show that
the specific property was exempt from the tax (the wrong description alone
does not suffice), show that the tax was paid prior to sale of the property
or redeemed prior to execution, was not able to show that he had any way
of ascertaining the assessment, and could not have known of the assessment
affecting his land (irrespective of the uncertainty of the lands as described
in the city's tax roll), no rightful claim for remedy was possible.
Legislatively subsection (12) was added to section 192.06 Florida
Statutes (1957)7; it exempts from real property tax real estate held and used
for production of income by a testamentary trust, where the income is
used exclusively for the construction and operation of a charitable non-
profit hospital. There are other circumstances necessary to qualify for this
exemption.
Section 193.11 Florida Statutes was amended by the 1957 legislature.8
The amendment provides that lands used for agricultural purposes be valued
per acre regardless of the fact that any or all of the lands are in a plat or
subdivision or other real estate development.
4. Fellowship Foundation v. Paul, 86 So.2d 808 (Fla. 1956) (injunction suitinvolvin5 a school).5 Gibbs v. Florida State Turnpike Authority, 91 So.2d 813 (Fla. 1957). See also
State v. Florida State Turnpike Authority, 80 So.2d 337 (ia. 1955) and State v. Flor-
ida State Turnpike Authority, 89 So.2d 653 (ila. 1956).
6. Thompson v. Key West, 82 So.2d 749 (la. 1955) (the decision was not
altered on a rehearing.
7. Laws of Fla., c. 57-816 (1957).
8. Laws of 2la., c. 57-195 (1957).
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(b) Tangible Personal Property.-Questions of exemptions as well as of
form and procedure were raised in Bariani v. SchulemanY Similar to that
situation is Thompson v. City of Key West 10 wherein the taxpayer missed
procedural steps such as filing a return and raising objections before the Board
of Equalization, Even though there was an error in the name, the statute
authorizes corrections of such errors, tinder which the taxrolls are validated
ab initio. The problem as to whether tangible personal property owned by
a Port Authority was exempt could not be dealt with because it had not
been raised at the trial." It would have been interesting to learn what the
supreme court would have said concerning the tax exempt status of storage
tanks attached to land owned by a Port Authority. Would it have become
part of the real estate which is exempt or would it have remained tangible
personal property for purposes of property taxation?
(c) Intangible Personal Property.-A recent decision 12 interpreted
section 199.08 Florida Statutes to be applicable to foreign corporations doing
business in Florida by stating that a corporation owning intangibles in several
counties is required to file an intangible personal property tax return only
in the county where its principal office or place of business is located. The
legislative intent was not clearly expressed but this appears to be a very
sensible solution.
Of much more practical import is the legislative change affecting "Intan-
gibles." Increases in rates were liberally authorized.'3
Also an important legislative change - a very practical one in its effect
on titles and title search - was the one setting up a 7 year statute of limi-
tations on liens unless they are recorded.' 4
(d) Homestead Exemption - The usual number of cases involving
homesteaders was decided during the last two years. Two cases appear to
be of significance. In L'Engle v. Forbes,'5 the court granted relief to the
claimant, rather liberally interpreting the relevant provisions; this writer
cannot agree with this interpretation. It appears to the author to be a
rather forced interpretation. Chapter 21880 of the Laws of Florida, Act
9. 94 So.2d 829 (Fla. 1957).
10. See note 6 supra.
11. See Jaynes v. Wellington Corp. 134 Fla. 211, 183 So. 718 (1938); South-
ern Liquor Distributors, Inc. v. Kaiser, 150 Fla. 52, 7 So.2d 600 (1942).
12. Green v. Forbes, 96 So.2d 902 (Fla. 1957).
13. Laws of Fla., c. 57-399 (1957) and amending FLA. STAT. § 199.11(1(2)
(1955). Effective July 1, 1955 the tax on Class "A" intangibles (primarily "Cash on
Deposit") was raised to 10 cents per $1,000. (i.e., from 1/20th of 1 mill to 1/10th
of I mill); on Class "B" intangibles (primarily "Stocks and Bonds") from $1.00 per
$1,000. value to $2.00 per $1,000. (i.e., from I mill to 2 mills). The second, increase
is rather heavy in its practical impact.
14. Laws of Fla., c. 57-106 (1957) amending FLA. STAT. § 199.22 (1955). Effec-
tive date of the amendment was May 15, 1957.
15. 81 So.2d 214 (Fla. 1955).
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of 1943,1l (a so-called saving provision) excuses the non-filing or late filing
for hometsead exemption of one who is in the armed services (plus one
year after the service discharge); it further states that this act ceases
to function one year after the present hostilities cease. "Present" hostilities
in 1943 clearly meant the Second World War, so this act should not have
been utilized in 1953.
The taxpayer-homesteader failed to apply on or before April 1, 1953,
for the year 1953; he filed late for homestead exemption, in October, 1953.
The statute 7 required timely filing; otherwise a waiver of the homestead
exemption claim was to be presumed. The court stretched a point by
explaining that a temporary absence did not deprive the homeowner of his
tax exemption unless there was a permanent intent to abandon it as a home-
stead.' 8 The court's reasoning as to a demonstration of the home owner's
good faith intention to recognize this as his home to the exclusion of other
places, and the characterization of his recall to active duty, as a rather
"forced activity," do not appear adequate, because the very definite
requirement of filing was not observed.
In a declaratory judgment case, Gautier v. Lapof,"9 the question of a
beneficial ownership entitlement to homestead exemption was under scrutiny.
A 99 year lease was assigned to the taxpayer on Sept. 1, 1953; the lease con-
tained an option to purchase which was not exercised until July 1, 1954.
Even though Florida Statutes, section 192.0420 grant the exemption to legal
as well as to beneficial owners, the plaintiffs did not even possess an equi-
table estate on January 1, 1954 (the determining date). They had a leasehold
estate and the homestead tax exemption does not apply to lessees. 2 ' The
court said that an equitable estate does not relate back, meaning, in this
case, a relation back to the date of the lease or date of option. Only at the
time the option to purchase is exercised does the title become vested (in
this instance July 1, 1954 and not January 1, 1954). The result reached
was certainly correct in the light of the existing provisions of the Florida
Constitution and Statutes.
As to the legislation, a new section22 provides a tax exemption for
paraplegees and provides a method for claiming the exemption.
16. Carried forward into Acts of 1949 and 1951 respectively, as FLA. STAT. § 19255.
17. FLA. STAT. § 192.16 (1957).
18. This had nothing to do with the filing requirement, which could have shown
that there was no intent to abandon permanently.
19. 91 So.2d 324 (Fla. 1956).
20. This section of FLA. STAT. is based on art. X, § 7 of the FLA. CONS'T.
21. One should not confuse Homestead Exemption with Homestead Tax Exemp-
tion; the former is granted to freeholders or even holders of lesser estates. See Menendez
v. Rodriguez, 106 Fla. 214, 143 So.223 (1932).
22. FLA. STAT. § 192.111 (1957).
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I. SALES AND USE TAx
This tax, having such a tremendous impact on the revenue of the state,
had a liberal judicial construction, and as was to be expected, the Comp-
troller's position was generally upheld.
The cases of Harvey v. Green23 and Green v. Reed Construction Corp.
24
are quite analogous. Both were decided in favor of the state and both dealt
with items made or manufactured, which were then used to improve real
property. In one instance there were concrete pilings for use in founda-
tions, invoiced at a cost basis plus installation cost (lump-sum);25 in the
other, there were products (grill work) of iron works, furnished for the
purpose of installation on a cost plus basis. The court held both to be tangible
personal properties with the sales of these items subject to sales tax charges.
The articles were finished products prior to being attached to realty and
were therefore sold as such. Since the statute 5 describes as a retail sale
any sale which is made for any other purpose than for resale, sales of pilings
or grill works were retail sales, consequently taxable. Items or articles made
for the customer, but not generally for sale at the place where they are made,
represent the essentials which make the customer the ultimate consumer, in
further consequence whereof the tax incidence occurs. One might have some
doubts as to the correctness of the decisions mentioned, on reading the lower
court's reasoning, favoring the taxpayer. In Green v. Reed Construction
Corp.,2 7 the court stated that a construction contract is closely linked with
improvements to realty, pilings are really unseverable from such a construc-
tion contract, like the building itself, and taxing statutes should be inter-
preted in favor of taxpayers. The court would not consider the items as tan-
gible personal property. The writer thinks there is some justification for
that interpretation, except that Rule 51 of the Rules and Regulations of the
Florida Sales and Use Tax Law cannot be overlooked;28 this rule deals in
great detail and clearness with "sales to or by contractors who repair, alter,
improve and construct real property."
In L. B. Smith Aircraft Corp. v. Green,2 9 aircraft parts were purchased to
convert old cargo aircraft into plush executive aircraft for resale. The rule
is that, normally, sales of second hand or used tangible personal property are
taxable sales; therefore parts and supplies used in remaking such second hand
or used items are tax exempt.3 0 Since, however, second hand or used motor
23. 85 So.2d 829 (Fla. 1956),
24. 91 So.2d 634 (Fla. 1956).
25. Id.
26. FLA. STAT. § 212.02(3) (1957).
27. See note 24 supra.
28. In Harvey v. Green, 85 So.2d 829 (Fla. 1956), the court stated: "Admin-
istrative rulings are of considerable persuasive force in the interpretation of a statute;"
see also: State ex tel. Fronton Exhibit Co. v. Stein, 198 So. 82 (1940).
29. 94 So.2d 832 (Fla. 1957).
30. RULES & RECULATIONS OF THE FLORIDA SALES AND USF TAx LAW, Rule 6(7)
first sentence.
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vehicles or airplanes arc exempt from the sales tax, parts and supplies used
for remaking these specific "articles" are subject to tax; the ultimate con-
sumer, taxwisc is the one incorporating the parts and supplies.3 ' This is
based on the statute312 or specific exemptions from the sales and use tax.
In the same case, the supreme court interpreted the statute exempting
"vehicles and vessels and parts thereof used to transport passengers or property
in interstate and foreign commerce."33 In this case parts for aircraft were
sold to those regularly engaged in such exempt commerce for incorporation
into vehicles used to transport the company's own executive or employees
over state lines, but the company was not a common carrier. While the
statute34 does not mention common carriers and the court admitted that
there was an interpretation possible under which the exemption would
apply, the court based its narrower interpretation on "common understand-
ing" (meaning restricted to "common carriers" only). Furthermore it relied
on Florida Statutes section 212.21 (3), which section advocates an all embrac-
ing tax program, except for exemptions dictated by federal and state con-
stitutions and specific exemptions within the law itself or its regulation.8 5
This author cannot agree with this interpretation because section 212.08 (3)
specifically exempts such "vehicles, vessels or parts thereof," indicating no
restriction of the exemption to "common carriers." The court apparently
read too much into the law.
Based on an interpretation of Florida Statutes, sections 212.06 (7) and
212.06 (8), as well as Rule 91 (3), the court in Green v. Railway Express
Agency" decided that that the Railway Express Agency had to pay the use
tax. The use tax is utilized to police the sales tax on goods bought out of
state, and subject to a sales tax there, but brought into the state for use here.
Goods were bought and stored in New York City and subjected to that city's
sales tax. Subsequently the same property was brought to Florida. No tax
would be imposed, based on sections 212.06 (7) and (8), since both tax
rates are the same (3%) unless a refund is allowed or allowable in New
York City. The Florida Sales or Use Tax would then be properly imposed.
In 1956 the supreme court determined in Green v. Hoine News Pub-
lishing Co. 7 that the Hialeah-Miami Springs Shopper Advertiser was not
an exempt newspaper within the meaning of the statute a8 The lower court
had held it to be a newspaper, even though only one out of twelve pages
31. See Id. second sentence.
32. FLA. STAT. § 212.08 (1957).
33. Ibid.
34. FLA. STAT. § 218.08 (3) (1957), last sentence.
35. The court stated that Rule 64 did not change its reasonable opinion because
there was no unreasonable burden on interstate commerce in the fact situation presented.
36. 96 So.2d 790 (1957).
37. 90 So.2d 295 (1956).
38. FLA, STAT. § 212.08 (4) (1957). SEE RULES & REGULATIONS OF THE Fi.oRIDA
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contained news, the rest being advertisements. The paper itself was a
"give away."
The case of Starr v. Karst, Inc.,"" concerned the exemption of
'machines and equipment used in plowing, planting, cultivating and harvest-
ing crops."40 The sheriff tried to make a distinction between such equipment
acquired for personal use (conceding tax exempt status) and for use on
others' land (denying tax exemption); Rule 87(1) seemed to give some
support to his position.' 1 This rule relates an exemption of farm machines
and equipment, when used exclusively on one's own farm or grove. The
court held that the Comptroller did not have statutory power to restrict
the exemptions.42
The 1957 legislature broadly revised the Sales and Use Tax Law,
broadening and widening the "embrace" of that tax. It is not possible in
this article to go into all facets of the law, important as they may be.
However, a few important points may be restated here.
Chapter 57-398 (S.B. 1416) re-arranges the specific exemptions as to
sales, rental, storage and use tax into more understandable categories. For
instance, the exemption of "general groceries" became an exemption of
"foods for human consumption;" also candies sold for 25 cents or less are
tax exempt items. These items of food are not exempt if served or sold
in places licensed by the Hotel and Restaurant Commission or "from
vehicles."
43
The exemptions of "medicals," which include patent medicines is
dealt with by a list to be approved by the State Board of Health and
certified by the Comptroller; this list must be included in the rules promul-
gated by him. This exemption remained the same except that items like
crutches, artificial limbs, eye-glasses, hearing aides, dentures, etc., were limited
to $500.00. The exemption for funeral expenses is appended to this subsection
and the old limitation of $500.00 per funeral was retained. 44
A partial exemption for motor vehicles applies from July 1, 1957;
previously these were totally tax exempt items. A 1% tax is imposed,
but in cases of trade-ins no tax is to be computed on trade-in values. The
Motor Vehicle Commissioner is not to issue title certificates unless a receipt
showing payment of the tax is submitted with the application for title
SALES & UsE TAx LAw RULES 8(1)(2) (3), 34.
39. 92 So.2d 519 (1957).
40. FLA. STAT. § 212.08(6) (1957).
41. RULES & RECULATIONS OF THE FLORIDA SALES & USE TAx LAw.
42. Why did the supreme court then interpret 212.08 (3) in L. Smith Aircraft
Corp. case, supra where the law is just as clear or unclear as here in 212.08 (6)? Section
212.08 (3) does not speak of common carriers directly nor indicate this special applica-
tion in any way; Section 212.08 (6) does not speak of machines and equipment speci-
ficially for one's own use only.
43. FLA. STAT. § 212.08(1) (1957).
44. FLA. STAT. § 212.08(2) (1957).
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certificate. This 1% tax applies to the sale, renting, use or storage for use
in this state of the motor vehicle.
45
Industrial machinery previously taxed up to $300.00 for a single
transaction is now taxed up to $1,000.00 for a single transaction. "Single
transaction" means an order placed and accepted for delivery within 6
months by one supplier, and the use in a particular location. Also the
term "machines, equipment, parts and accessories therefor" is explained.
Other interpretations are left to the Comptroller's rule making power.
48
The 1957 Florida Legislature climinated the total exemption of alcoholic
beverages by limiting the exemption to sales in packaged form for con-
sumption off the premises; 47 likewise the exemption on various fuels, electric
energy and cigarettes was eliminated.4 s
Florida Statutes section 212.08(9) declares the legislative intent. The
legislators "intended" to raise additional revenue to meet appropriations;
the act states that all other exemptions allowed by the statute,49 which
were not specifically mentioned in the act, were eliminated. 0
Also important as to legislative intent is the declaration that the 1%
tax on motor vehicles5' is not a property tax, an ad valorem tax, nor a
substitute for the license tax; it is a tax on the privilege to sell, rent, use
or store,
5 2
Finally the lawmakers declared that there shall be no pyramiding of
excise taxes by the state and no municipality is to levy any excise tax on
admission, lease, rental, sale, use or storage for use (except already validly
existing municipal levies).?a
The amended section 212.11 Florida Statutes deals with tax returns and
regulations. It allows for filing of consolidated returns where the same
dealer operates two or more places of business. Separate returns for each
and every establishment had been required previously.
The amended section 212.12(10) lowered the bracket on which the
tax is to be computed by exempting single sales of less than 10 cents from
taxability (formerly sales of less than 11 cents). The other brackets did
not change.
Chapter 57-109 (H.B. 153) also dealt with the Sales and Use Tax Statute.
It amended section 212.14 by way of addition of a subparagraph and it
45. FLA. STAT. § 212.08(3) (1957).
46. FLA. STAT. § 212.08(4) (1957).
47. FLA. STAT. § 212.08(5) (1957).
48. Other subsections have been rearranged. Section 212.08(7) and (8) now
contain what was previously contained in 212.08 (3) (6) and (9).
49. FLA. STAT. § 212.08 (1957).
50. FLA. STAT. § 212.08(9) (a) (1957).
51. See note 5 supra.




extended the statute of limitations to 3 years (previously 2 years) during
which the comptroller can make assessments. Related thereto was an
amendment of the sections dealing with record keeping requirements,
extending these to 3 years. 4
III OCCUPATIONAL LicENsE TAXES
A peddler and an "employment agency" wete involved in cases requiring
supreme court action. Even though the court upheld a criminal conviction
in the case of Bozeman v Brooksville,"' as to the license problem the court
held 56 that an ordinance setting license fees (for peddlers) on a per day,
per week, per month, or per year basis, then allowing the mayor to adjust
such a fee whenever he believes the fee to be an undue burden on interstate
commerce, and finally permitting the mayor to base the fee on a gross sales
percentage, was invalid. The theory of the court was that the fee bore no
relation to the costs of issuing of such an ordinance or the expenses to be
expected in its enforcement. Such regulatory fees are to be determined or
set by such cost, or expense criteria in order to be valid. In addition, the
ordinance attempted to levy a tax on an occupation performed in some
other municipality; therefore it was extra-territorial in operation and also
invalid for this reason.
57
Manpower, Inc. operates in many cities in the United States (the
home office is in Milwaukee); it provides full or part time services of office
help, factory workers, drivers and helpers, etc., with the services to be
performed either at the customer's place of business or at the company's
office. The company hires and fires these employees who are under its
control. It contracts with the applying customers for these varied services,
such contracts containing a clause stating that Manpower, Inc. will not
employ the customer's personnel or vice versa. The Florida Industrial
Commission wanted to apply the Florida Employment Agency Statute to
Manpower, Inc., '8 trying to force the company to get a license or to cease
and desist operations; this was a suit for both an injunction and declaratory
decree.19 In 1956, the supreme court affirmed the lower court in upholding
Manpower's position. This was not a brokerage for labor, therefore not an
employment agency.60 A literal interpretation, attempted by the Florida
54. FLA. STAT. §§ 212.04, 212.12(4)(7), 212,13(2) (1957).
55. 82 So.2d 729 (Fla. 1955).
56. Upheld conviction due to severability of requirement to obtain permits from
provisions requiring payment of a license fee; conviction was based on non-compliance
with requirements for obtaining a peddler's or hawker's permit, thereby violating an
ordinance.
57. Mr. Bozeman sold strictly from samples in Brooksville and delivered later. The
place of business of his firm, and therefore his occupation was located in Bartow.
58. FLA. STAT. § 449.01 (1957).
59. Florida Industrial Comm'n v. Manpower, Inc. of Miami, 97 So.2d 197 (Fla.
1956)0. Comfare with MeMillan v. City of Knoxville, 139 Tenn. 319, 202 S.W. 65(1918).
1958]
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Industrial Commission, did not work. Highly regulatory penal laws are
not to be extended by construction.
IV UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION TAX
The case of Pleus v. Vocele, 1 struggled with Florida Statutes, section
443.03. The Florida Industrial Commission tried to invoke the Unemploy-
ient Compensation Cont-ribution-Tax by treating a corporation and a
partnership composed of the same individuals as stockholders and partners
respectively as a single unit by virtue of which "operation" the unit would
have come within the prerequisites necessary for taxation. That would
have been proper under the pre-1947 statute,02 which stated that "any
employing unit which .. .directly or indirectly by the same interests or...
which owns or controls one or more other employing units . .. (may be]
I . . treated as a single unit .... "'3 This statute was repealed in 1947.
Since there were two separate entities, different businesses, with separate
books and records, etc., the Commission's claim had to be disallowed.64
V DOCUMENTARY STAMP TAXES
In an original mandamus proceeding a stamp tax which had been paid
was ordered to be refunded. In State v. Green,65 the supreme court stated that
the applicable statute " had been derived from an opinion by the Attorney
General of the state in 193601 and that real property conveyed to stock-
holders in exchange for corporate stock in proportion to their stockholdings,
all in connection with a corporate dissolution and liquidation (a partial
liquidation) did not require a stamp tax affixed on the deed or deeds con-
veying the property; there was a simple exchange; no consideration passed;
no sale or purchase took place.
Another mandamus proceeding to recover stamp taxes, was involved
in State v. Gay. 8 A Florida corporation supplying telephone and wire
service issued bonds, secured by Florida real estate. The bonds were
executed and delivered in New York; the mortgages in the form of trust
indentures were also executed in New York. Meetings of the board of
directors took place in New York; no activities connected with the bond
issue, directly or indirectly, took place in Florida. The State Comptroller
contended the tax was a tax for the privilege of borrowing money and a
Florida corporation borrowing money is subject to the tax; the trial judge
agreed and denied recovery. The supreme court granted relief, properly
61. 92 So.2d 604 (1957).
62. FLA. STAT. § 443.03(7) (d) 1941) repealed by Florida Laws c. 24085 (1947).
63. Laws of Fla. c. 18402, act of 1937, as amended by c. 19637 act of 1939.
64. Could not FLA. STAT. § 443.03(6) (b) apply?
65. 88 So.2d 493 (Fla. 1956).
66. FLA. STAT. § 201 (1957).
67. 28 Ops. Anr' Ger. Biennial Reports 1935-36,
68. 90 So.2d 132 (Fla. 1956).
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stating that this was a transfer tax, a tax on the transaction, not a tax for
a privilege of doing business. Since Florida Statutes, section 201.01 imposes
a stamp tax on documents signed, executed and delivered in the state
and section 201.07 refers to imposition of the tax on all bonds issued in
the state, the refund of the tax paid under protest was held to be in order.
As to Legislation, c. 57-107 repealed section 201.03 of Fla. Statutes
(10 cent tax on powers of attorney) and section 201.06 (10 cent tax on
proxies of stockholders). It added section 201.131 allowing payment of tax
imposed by Section 201 by using metering machines. C. 57-397 increased
the stamp tax on deeds or other instruments from 10 cents per $100.00
consideration to 20 cents for $100.00 all concerning purchase of land (a
100% increase).
VI ESTATE TAxEs
The legislature enacted a few provisions of some importance. For
instance, Chapters 57-87 (S.B. 401), amending section 734.01 Florida
Statutes, demanded that this tax be paid first out of the residuary estate,
if sufficient; if insufficient this tax is to be paid out of property passing
tinder the will in the order or appropriation of assets of the estate, as is
prescribed by section 734.05.
Also Chapter 57-108 (H.B. 151) amended sections 198.22 and 198.33.
Liens for unpaid state taxes attach now to the proceeds of sale of the
property to a bona fide purchaser; the estate tax lien is limited to 20 years
from the date of the death of the decedent (resident or non-resident), after
which period it is discharged.
VII GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS TAX MA'rrERS
In the course of proceedings to validate revenue bonds the tax exempt
status of the Inter-American Center Authority was decided.6 9 The criterion
for tax exempt status is the use to which the property is put rather than
the ownership of such property. This "authority" is educational and scien-
tific in nature. Therefore the constitutional tax exemption 0 can be granted.
Sections .554.01 and 554.16 Act of 1955, chapter 29830, granted the
Inter-American Center Authority exempt status under the Florida Con-
stitution 7 thereby exempting it from taxes on bonds, admissions and other
excises. This having been expressly stated by the legislature, it was not
for the court to state whether the legislature exceeded or abused its con-
stitutional prerogative.
A 24-hour, or even less, delays saved the International Company,
operating a restaurant in Miami, from having a license revoked or suspended
69. State v. Inter American Center Authority, 84 So.2d 9 (Fla. 1955).
70. FLA. CoNs'T. art IX, § 1, Ft.A. STAT. § 192.06(1)(2) (1957).
71. Ibid.
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for permitting gambling activities on the premises. 72 The proceedings were
instituted by petition for a writ of prohibition. the applicable Florida
Statutes73 prescribe for suspension or revocation in cases where gambling
is allowed and further requires that proceedings are to commence within
60 days after the cause arises.74 The statute further states that "proceedings
.,. shall be by serving a copy of written notice as provided in section 511.29;"
while section 511.29 requires all notices in writing to be delivered personally
or by Deputy Hotel Commissioner or by registered letter. . . ." What actually
happened? The registered letter was sent on the 59th day but was not
delivered until the 61st day. Since proceedings commence with serving
a copy of a notice under section 511.29, the delivery and commencing of
the suit should have been within 60 days. Here this did not take place
until after 60 days and the Hotel and Restaurant Commissioner was barred
from entertaining the proceeding.
72. Edgerton v. International Co., 89 So.2d 488 (Fla. 1956).
73. FLA. STAT. § 511.051 (1957).
74, FLA. STAT. § 511.05(5) (1957).
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